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-4 -Another problem is that only those terrorist events reflected in official statistics and reported in the media are counted. Reliance on official statistics is often mistaken, because either the authorities themselves do not know or deliberately bias their reporting.
The media only pick up on some terrorist events, mostly those occurring in the larger cities or the capital of the country, where the foreign journalists normally reside. Terrorist action taking place in remote rural areas is rarely, if ever, reported in the media. The problem of biased reporting is especially severe in less developed and authoritarian countries (see e.g. Miller 1994 ).
The problems associated with the limits of comparing different types of attacks and of biased reporting of attacks have been addressed in various ways in the literature. First, the analysis is usually confined to developed countries where the reporting bias is less of a problem. Second, the consequences are often estimated for a small number of countries, or even a single country, where modes of attack are comparable across countries and over time (exceptions are the combined cross-country and time-series analyses of Blomberg et al. 2004a; Nitsch and Schumacher 2004 discussed below) . Third, some authors explicitly differentiate between attacks of different types and at different locations (see e.g. Drakos and Kutan 2003; Fielding 2003b ).
In the case of international terrorism, where foreign interests are involved, the reporting bias is likely to be less severe. Employing the official US definition of terrorism (22 USC § 2656f [d] ), the US Department of State issues series covering the annual number of incidents of international terrorism and the number of fatalities. International terrorism is defined as terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. These series are depicted in figure 1.
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Number of Fatalities Number of Incidents 3250 Figure 1 : International terrorism, 1968 International terrorism, -2003 of incidents and number of fatalities Source: US Department of State (various years) and Sandler and Enders (2004) .
The number of terrorist events recorded in this statistic varies considerably from 125 in 1968 to 665 in 1987. 5 Since reaching a peak in the late 1980s, the number of incidents has been on the decline. This finding contrasts with the general notion that terrorism has become an ever-increasing threat. The number of people killed in terrorist incidents also varies considerably, from 34 in 1968 to 3,250 in 2001. No clear trend is visible and the series is greatly influenced by spectacular events, such as the simultaneous bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the attacks of September 11, 2001 . As these series exhibit, the level of international terrorist acts is on the decline, while the number of fatalities has not been reduced as much. This implies that terrorism has become increasingly lethal -a common observation made by scholars studying terrorism. According to Enders and Sandler (2002) , an incident in recent years is about 17 percentage points more likely to result in casualties than in the 1970s. This increase in lethality has been attributed to the increasing proportion of fundamentalist terrorist groups seeking mass casualties of innocent people to make their cause more widely known. In contrast, the leftist-based terrorists and nationalist terrorists want to instigate a revolution and aim at winning the hearts of the people. They therefore avoid killing or maiming innocent people not directly connected with the existing political and economic regime.
Further, using spectral analysis on a quarterly index of various terrorist activities (ITERATE, International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events; see Mickolus 1982 and Mickolus et al. 1989; , a number of cycles have been identified (Enders and Sandler 2002) . Logistically complicated incidents, such as large-scale suicide car bombings, the hijacking of planes and assassinations have longer cycles than less sophisticated events. Terrorist activity developing in cycles, rather than as a continuous movement in one direction, has been attributed to various causes: demonstration and imitation effects act as propagators; economies of scale in planning terrorist incidents lower the cost for a restricted period of time; after a terrorist act there is a public outcry, inducing the authorities to take drastic measures which, again for a restricted period of time, reduce international terrorist activity. This "attack-counterattack cycle" results in fluctuations.
Terrorism's impact on various aspects of the economy
Over the last few years, scholars have analyzed the effects terrorist acts have on various aspects of the economy. In the following, the results for tourism, foreign direct investment, savings and consumption, investment, stock markets, foreign trade, the urban economy (including the costs of the attacks of September 11, 2002), and overall economic development are surveyed. In an early, influential paper, Enders and Sandler (1991) Aggregating the annual impacts of this initial shock (i.e. the impact of the increase in terrorism in later years is not included), total losses in revenue are approximately $57 billion (1996 present value discounted at 5%). Ito and Lee (2004) assess the impact of the September 11 attacks and the imposition of stringent new security requirements on domestic airline demand in the USA. The authors estimate a reduced form model of demand for air services with monthly time-series data since 1986 and model the post-September 11 period as an attenuating shock process, that has both a transitory and an ongoing component. After controlling for cyclical, seasonal and other unique events impacting the industry, the initial demand shock is estimated to be more than 30% measured in revenue passenger miles (RPMs), and 7.3% measured in yields. The decline in yield is smaller because a large number of airline tickets are purchased well in advance. In addition to the transitory shock, there is an ongoing downward shift in the demand of 7.4% measured in RPMs and of 10% measured in yields. The decline in demand is especially pronounced in the short-haul market, where more substitution possibilities are available. On the basis of a counterfactual demand prediction the authors conclude that the terror attacks and security measures account for roughly 94% of the decline in RPMs from the historical peak.
Estimated impacts of terrorism on tourism vary considerably, because the structure of the tourism industry and terror campaigns differ, not only across countries, but also over time. This hampers comparisons between studies. Instead, it emphasizes the importance of differentiating between different types of attacks, e.g. the location of an attack (i.e.
whether it takes place in an urban or a rural area) and the number of casualties (see e.g. Drakos and Kutan 2003) .
Some scholars argue that terrorism could also be a reaction to irresponsible tourism development (e.g. Aziz 1995, p. 93, for Egypt) . In the aforementioned study for Spain by Enders and Sandler (1991) , the argument is empirically assessed. It is found that causality is unidirectional, i.e. terrorism affects the inflow of tourists, but not the reverse.
The figures presented so far measure how the tourism industry in a particular country (or region) is affected by terrorist attacks taking place in that country (or region). However, two interdependencies between different countries' tourism industries and their terrorist campaigns are possible. On the one hand, the deterrent effect of terrorism on tourists in a particular country may benefit the tourism industries in alternative destinations. On the other hand, tourists may fear that terrorism could spill over into countries previously not involved and, therefore, abstain from visiting neighboring countries. Though the substitution effect and the contagion effect (or negative externality) are countervailing, they can be simultaneously present. The regional interdependencies are explicitly modeled in the analysis of Drakos and Kutan (2003 affected by terrorism than the sum of the country-by-country effects would imply. This result is again evidence for a contagion effect or negative externalities.
-10 -A note of caution is in order with regard to the temporal patterns of the impact of terrorism on tourism. 7 The temporal pattern depends on the type of attacks in a particular country, and the market structure as well as the type of time-series used by researchers.
Time-series on the number of actual visits are likely to respond more quickly to a terrorist incident than time-series on tourism revenues, due to long-term contracts between tourist destinations and tour operators. Nevertheless, surprisingly different time spans are estimated until tourism begins to respond to a terrorist incident after it has elapsed. While Enders and Sandler (1991) and Fleischer and Buccola (2002) find relatively immediate effects of terrorism on tourism, i.e. after two to three months, for Spain and Israel respectively, Enders et al. (1992) find tourism to be unaffected by a terrorist incident until a full 18 to 21 months afterwards in the case of continental Europe and Austria respectively.
To summarize, terrorism systematically influences tourists' choice of destination and can, therefore, substantially negatively affect a host country. Moreover, the effect is longlasting and has an impact on the demand for tourism in neighboring countries.
It remains an open question whether tourists' reactions to the threat of terrorism are rational.
According to a RAND survey conducted in 1989, a third of those Americans interviewed said they would refuse the opportunity to travel abroad because of the risk of terrorism (Downes-Le Guin and Hoffman 1993). It is hard to think of similar precautionary measures against life-threatening eventualities taking place with the same likelihood.
More generally, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) find that people are subject to a propensity to predict worst-case scenarios in assessing terrorism risks and are prone to anomalies known from other risk perception contexts. Similarly, Sunstein (2003) shows that individuals focus on the badness of the outcome rather than on the probability that it will occur. The "probability neglect" results in fear that greatly exceeds discounted harm.
Foreign direct investment (FDI). Terrorism affects the allocation decision of firms
investing money in real foreign assets. Terrorists can quite easily attack and damage foreign owned firms, seriously disrupting their activities. As the foreigners have a large choice of countries to invest in, even quite mild terrorist activities tend to considerably reduce the inflow of capital to a terror-stricken country.
This has been well documented in the case of Spain and Greece, again using VAR methodology and quarterly terrorism data (Enders and Sandler 1996) . In Spain, terrorism is estimated to have reduced annual FDI inflow by 13.5% on average for the period 1975-1991. This translates into a decline in real FDI of almost 500 million dollars. In a similar period of time (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) , Greece was plagued by two major terrorist organizations, the (Fielding 2003b, p. 175) . 11 The effect of terrorism on the systematic risk (beta) is studied for the events of September 11. In a sample of US firms from various sectors, models with time-varying betas find very heterogeneous effects of the event (Choudhry 2003) . For the airline industry around the world, however, there is a clear structural break. Conditional systematic risk, on average, doubled following September 11, 2001, whereby US airlines were most affected (Drakos 2004 ).
factual market capitalization, one has, for example, to take into consideration that stock prices already reflect expected terrorist attacks before any event actually occurs. Previous research, therefore, has concentrated on single unexpected events or intensifications of terrorist activities.
An event which has been carefully analyzed is the cease-fire the Basque ETA declared between 1998 and 1999 (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003) . This can be taken to be a natural experiment to estimate the cost of the terrorist conflict in terms of its effect on the stock In a broad event study for 14 terrorist/military attacks, returns on the US capital market are analyzed (Chen and Siems 2004 The collapse of the twin towers destroyed 13 million square feet of real estate, and 30% of superior office space in downtown New York. But this accounts for only 4% of the total office space situated in Manhattan. One estimate of the real and human capital costs ranges from 25 to 60 billion dollars (Becker and Murphy 2001) . Another study estimates the human capital loss to be 40 billion dollars, and the property loss to be between 10 and 13 billion dollars (Navarro and Spencer 2001) . Yet another estimate of the total direct loss is 21.4 billion dollars (International Monetary Fund 1989) . Looking at the extent of destruction relative to the overall US productive capacity indicates that the damage was minor (Brauer 2002) . The estimates of between 10 and 60 billion dollars worth of damage resulting from the attacks of September 11, 2001 is relatively small compared to the American GNP of 10 trillion dollars.
However, the indirect costs may be substantial. They consist of the induced cost of doing business, for instance longer waitings at airports, higher friction and transactions costs in international trade, as well as the cost of the military and civilian resources used to fight terrorism. To achieve a significant reduction in the probability of falling prey to a terrorist attack is certainly expensive. The fraction of the economic potential that can be used for consumption today and in the future is significantly reduced. But it is impossible to attach any serious figure to these factors. This is particularly so if the effects outside the United
States are also taken into account. Based on a computable general equilibrium model (Walkenhorst and Dihel 2002) , it has been estimated that the indirect cost of increased economic friction in international trade is larger for other regions of the world than for North America.
9. National income and growth. Estimating the overall effect of terrorism on the economy 13 is faced with the problem of how the economy would have developed if there had been less terrorism, or no terrorism at all. To construct a counterfactual is not easy.
An interesting attempt has been made for the Basque country, with a "synthetic" control region made up of other Spanish regions, but in many ways resembling the relevant economic characteristics of the Basque country before the onset of political terrorism by the ETA in the 1970s (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003) . The subsequent economic development of this counterfactual synthetic region is compared to the actual experience 13 The effect of general political instability (or stable political institutions, alternatively) on the growth of national income has been analyzed using cross section data by Barro (1991) , Alesina et al. (1996) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) among others. The latter studies also address the problem of reverse causality: as argued by Olson (1982) , political instability may not only be a cause but also an effect of economic fluctuations. The same might be true in the case of terrorism. A notable study analyzing the effect of income and education on terrorism is a paper by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) . On the basis of a variety of evidence, such as the influence of living standards on the support for violent attacks by Palestinians on Israelis expressed in opinion polls and a comparison of the characteristics of the Hezbollah activists killed with those of the general Lebanese population, the authors conclude that terrorism is not a response to bad economic conditions: "[T]he evidence we have assembled does not indicate a connection between poverty and terrorism, and we are not aware of compelling evidence that points in the opposite direction" (Krueger and Maleckova 2003, p. 121 However, the authors convincingly argue that the two biases are likely to be small.
An extensive VAR study of the macroeconomic effects of terrorism (Blomberg et al. 2004a ; see also Blomberg et al. 2004b ) uses a panel set with annual observations for 177 countries from 1968 to 2000. It controls for the interactions between terrorism and other forms of internal and external conflict and is therefore able to differentiate between similar types of political disruptions. On average, terrorism (captured by the ITERATE data) is found to depress economic growth in a marked, and statistically significant, way.
However, this effect is considerably smaller and less persistent than that exerted by external wars and internal conflicts. Spending is diverted from investment to public expenditures. Interestingly enough, the negative association between terrorism and economic growth is small and statistically insignificant for advanced (OECD) economies, which are most affected by terrorism. The depressing effect of terrorism on economic growth appears to be most significant for developing countries. Overall, the relationship between terrorism and economic growth can mainly be attributed to country fixed effects. Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) These effects of terrorist actions on the various sectors and the overall economy do not capture the total costs of terrorism. Non-market values are, by definition, excluded from these measures. The fear of individuals and the grief of the victims and the bereaved are disregarded. It follows that the damage perpetrated by terrorism may be considerably underestimated. If policy makers take the estimates discussed above seriously, they would allocate too little money to dealing with terrorism and rather use the funds and their energy for pursuing other goals. In the following section, therefore, methods are discussed for capturing total utility losses people suffer as a result of terrorist activities.
Utility consequences of terrorism
The disutility from the public bad, terrorism, like the benefits from public goods, is inherently difficult to measure. However, a wide variety of different approaches for the measurement of preferences has been developed (see, e.g., Freeman 2003) , in particular to value environmental quality and the cultural heritage. These approaches can potentially be applied to value the threat of terrorism as well. We briefly discuss existing techniques emphasizing possible advantages and likely drawbacks in the study of terrorism. The focus is on a new, and we think, promising approach: the life satisfaction approach.
Traditional methods
Two avenues have been pursued to infer and elicit individuals' preferences for public goods and externalities: stated preference methods on the one hand and revealed preference methods on the other hand. The most prominent exponent of the former is the contingent valuation method and of the latter the hedonic market approach.
1. Contingent valuation surveys enable researchers to assess the effect of a reduction of terrorism on utility, including non-use values. 15 Terrorism is directly assessed, using survey questions on people's willingness to pay, for example, for a bisection of the number of terrorist incidents in a region. While this is an appealingly easy framework, there are a number of difficulties with this approach. The survey respondents find themselves in an unfamiliar situation and may be induced to give strategic responses.
Important design issues to address these problems are the presentation of adequate information, a credible (hypothetical) payment mechanism and the use of the incentivecompatible referendum format (Portney 1994) . In order to avoid symbolic valuation, a survey must also contain a detailed description of a hypothetical policy program, which the respondents believe to be capable of providing the public good in question, i.e. the reduction in terrorist incidents. In light of the failure of most traditional anti-terrorism policies, this is likely to be a difficult task.
A basic problem of applying contingent valuation to terrorism is that it is not obvious what preferences should enter. Two aspects are of particular importance. First, psychological anomalies play a major role. A vital aspect is that the disparity between gains and losses matters. It is therefore important whether one asks what people would be prepared to pay in order to reduce terrorism, or what they would be prepared to accept in order to tolerate some degree of terrorism. Second, terrorism is an international phenomenon and terrorists often have no difficulty in moving from one country to another. For this reason, the anti-terrorism policies of a particular country produce international or even global externalities. An anti-terrorism policy that successfully prevents terrorists from attacking a particular country increases the probability of attacks in other countries (Lee 1988; Sandler and Lapan 1988) . On the other hand, anti-terrorism policies, based on positive incentives (Frey and Luechinger 2003; , entail positive externalities for other countries. The dimension of the relevant population, whose values for security from a specific terrorist campaign should be sought, is a question of values.
Another problem with a contingent valuation survey is that individuals evaluate specific objects or specific victims quite differently from a non-specified, or statistical, victim (Schelling 1968; Small and Loewenstein 2003) . People are prepared to spend much less on efforts to save as yet unidentified lives than identified lives from terrorist attacks.
are the subject of a heated controversy in economic literature, as a symposium in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (Diamond and Hausman 1994; Hanemann 1994; Portney 1994) demonstrates.
-21 -Contingent valuation surveys may nevertheless provide valuable insights into the utility losses imposed by terrorism. So far there is only one survey study that examines the trade-off between money and terrorism risk (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2003) . The main research interest of this study, however, is whether the answers reflect a rational response to terrorism risks. The subjects were asked what increase in the price of a plane ticket they would be willing to pay if the risk of a terrorist attack on an airplane were to be reduced (a) by 50%, (b) to one in a million per flight, (c) to one in 10 million per flight or finally (d) to zero. The average increase in price subjects are willing to pay for a plane ticket is (a) ca. 25%, (b) ca. 38%, (c) ca. 53% and (d) ca. 70% respectively. These estimates reflect a well-known premium for reaching a zero risk level (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979 for the "certainty effect").
2. The hedonic market approach is based on the idea that markets, primarily the housing and the labor markets, reflect the utility losses imposed on individuals by terrorist activity. 16 Higher wages must be paid to compensate employees for the disamenities incurred by working in a region ridden with terrorism. Similarly, the rent for housing and land to be paid is negatively affected by terrorism. In equilibrium, the marginal implicit compensations associated with working or living in a region plagued by terrorism equals the corresponding marginal willingness to accept. To our knowledge, no study employs the hedonic market approach in particular, or revealed preference methods in general, to evaluate the consequences of terrorism.
A major drawback of the hedonic market approach is that it is based on the assumption that the market is perfect and in equilibrium, and fully reflects changes in the amount and intensity of terrorism. The adjustment that people are likely to make in response to changes in the intensity of a terrorist campaign, as well as changes in the supply side of the hedonic property market, needs to be accounted for (Freeman 2003, pp. 373 and 381 Sunstein 2003; Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2003) . This also implies that unanticipated and cataclysmic terrorist acts cannot be evaluated. Further, revealed preferences may reflect anticipated future risk rather than current risk. Finally, revealed preference methods cannot capture non-use values.
Effects on Life Satisfaction
People's assessment of their overall well-being can be directly captured by measures of The estimated coefficients for terrorism and individual income can be used to calculate the hypothetical willingness-to-pay for a discrete change in the level of terrorism. calculate a hypothetical willingness-to-pay of a resident of Northern Ireland for a reduction in the number of fatalities to the average level of Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. Accordingly, a resident of Northern Ireland (with average household income) would be willing to pay around 41% of his income for a reduction in terrorist activity to the level that prevails in the more peaceful parts of the country or the sister republic. This estimate is surprisingly high. However, it might to some extent reflect the ferocity of the conflict. After all, Northern Ireland was on the brink of all-out civil war; Fay et al. (1999, p. 204) , for example, estimate that around two thirds of the Northern Irish population live in households where someone has been injured in a conflict related incident.
This result indicates that utility losses may far exceed the economic consequences discussed in section 3.
Concluding remarks
A lot of the research on terrorism, even by economists, is based on the number of terrorist incidents and casualties. As our survey shows, it is possible to go much further. A sizeable literature already exists on the economic consequences of terrorism, such as on -25 -tourism, foreign direct investment, savings and consumption, investment, stock prices, foreign trade and the urban economy as well as national income and growth. But studies so far have neglected to analyze the utility losses induced by terrorism, which we suggest are considerably larger than the purely economic losses. The standard method of measuring the benefits (or costs) of public goods (or bads) is to employ stated preference methods (in particular, contingent valuation surveys) and revealed preference methods (for example, by looking at hedonic markets). However, these approaches face considerable problems, especially when an attempt is made to estimate the utility losses resulting from terrorism, and so have not yet been used for that purpose.
We propose a new approach based on life satisfaction or subjective well-being data, which are collected independently of the data on terrorist activities, and are therefore not biased by any immediate priming effects. The estimates presented reveal that terrorism leads a considerable reduction in life satisfaction, suggesting that individuals incur large utility losses. Individuals would need to receive substantial increases in income in order to compensate for the harm inflicted by terrorism. The results reported here refer only to the Northern Ireland conflict. It would certainly be necessary to apply this approach to different countries, different periods of history and different types of terrorism. Future research needs to undertake systematic comparisons between the standard methods of measuring the benefits of public goods and the life satisfaction approach. It should be taken into account that the measures of life satisfaction apllied here could be improved upon. The life satisfaction approach should therefore not be criticized solely on the basis of the existing quality of subjective well-being measures. Rather, scholars need to evaluate the extent to which a meaningful relationship can be established, and econometrically estimated, between life satisfaction data and terrorist acts.
Future research should also endeavor to distinguish between the direct and indirect consequences of a terrorist incident. The indirect consequences include the costs imposed on the population of the targeted country by the political reactions. As discussed above, numerous reported estimates reflect the direct consequences of terrorism as well as the impact of the subsequent counter measures. In the case of foreign trade and the aviation industry, for example, enhanced security measures are likely to account to a considerable extent for the reduction in bilateral trade and the drop in demand. Political reactions may -26 -reflect voters' demands for increased security or politicians' strategic exploitation of the "rally round the flag" effect, and may range from increased expenditures for military and secret services to restrictions on human rights. More extensive studies would not only require data on the number and severity of terrorist attacks, but would also need to analyze the determinants of political actions imposing these indirect costs on the population.
